CVE-2026-108360 — Vulnerability intelligence

PHP / Composer — phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Published:

CVSS
6.4
CISA KEV
Not listed; not proof of no exploitation

Original source text (not a translation)

PhpSpreadsheet: SSRF whitelist bypass via unre-validated HTTP redirect in Drawing::setPath external image loading ## Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `Worksheet\Drawing::setPath()` validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied `isWhitelisted` callback **once**, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with `file_get_contents()` using a stream context that does **not** set `follow_location => 0`. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP `302 Location:` redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP's HTTP wrapper (default `follow_location=1`, `max_redirects=20`) with **no re-validation of the redirect hop** — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server. This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the `follow_location => 0` fix (commit `7ef7b25e`) was applied ONLY to `Calculation/Web/Service.php`; `Worksheet/Drawing.php` was never touched. ## Root Cause `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php`: - Scheme allowlist at `:125` (`/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/`) permits `http`/`https` (the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only. - Opt-in gate `if (!$allowExternal)` at `:128` (requires `setAllowExternalImages(true)`; default `false`, `BaseReader.php:55`). - Whitelist check `if ($isWhitelisted !== null && !$isWhitelisted($path))` at `:131` — validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect. - Stream context built at `:140-152` sets `user_agent` + `header` (+ `ssl.crypto_method` for https) but **omits `follow_location`**. `git grep follow_location` on tag 5.9.0 yields a single hit — `Service.php:45` (the CVE-2026-59931 fix) — confirming it was never added to `Drawing.php`. - Sink `file_get_contents($path, false, $ctx)` at `:154`. ## Impact Blind SSRF from the server: reach and trigger internal GET-driven endpoints, coarse internal reachability/port probing, and reach cloud-metadata endpoints. The fetched body is written to a temp file, checked with `isImage()` (mime `image/*`, or `application/octet-stream` with `bin`/`emf` extension), only image dimensions are stored, and the temp file is `unlink`ed — so the response body is **not** exfiltrated (non-image responses fail `isImage()`). This is a blind GET primitive, not full response read. ## Proof of Concept 1. Attacker server `https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png` returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`. 2. `evil.xlsx` with `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels`: `<Relationship ... Type=".../image" Target="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png" TargetMode="External"/>`. 3. Victim: `$r = new Xlsx(); $r->setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted(fn($p)=>str_contains($p,'trusted-whitelisted.example')); $r->load('evil.xlsx');` -> the server-side GET is forced to the internal target despite the whitelist. HTML-reader variant: `<img src="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png">` loaded via `Reader\Html` (`Html.php:1237`) with the same reader settings. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: crafted `evil.xlsx`, `xl/drawings/_rels/*.rels` `TargetMode="External"`, `Target="https://trusted.example/redir.png"` (whitelisted host). Guard: none (legal external-image relationship). Bypass proof: Target stored verbatim -> `$url` at `Reader/Xlsx.php:1544`. 2. Config: victim loads with `setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted($cb)` where `$cb` allows `trusted.example`. Guard: `Drawing.php:128` opt-in (satisfied) + `:131` whitelist. Bypass proof: initial URL is whitelisted -> returns true; check runs once on `$path`. 3. Fetch/redirect: `file_get_contents` (`:154`) GETs the URL; whitelisted host returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`. Guard: stream context (`:140-152`). Bypass proof: no `follow_location` key -> PHP follows the redirect (default `follow_location=1`, `max_redirects=20`) with no re-validation. 4. Impact: server issues a blind GET to the internal target (body temp-filed, `isImage()`-checked, dimensions stored, temp file unlinked — body not exfiltrated). ## Bypass Evidence - `git grep follow_location 5.9.0 -- src/` -> single hit at `Service.php:45`; `Drawing.php` has none. - CVE-2026-59931's own regression harness (`ServerTest.php` + `redirect.php`: a whitelisted host 302-redirects to `direct.php`; only after `follow_location => 0` does the fetch stop following it) demonstrates the exact behavior. That fix is present in `Service.php` and absent in `Drawing.php`. - `git grep isWhitelisted 5.9.0 -- src/` confirms the callback is applied only at `Drawing.php:131` (initial `$path`), never after the redirect. ## Affected Versions `>= 5.5.0, <= 5.9.0`. The `isWhitelisted` control being bypassed was introduced in 5.5.0 (commit `50a7552f`); present and unfixed on the latest release (5.9.0) and on HEAD (`05e99ebf`). No post-release fix to `Drawing.php`. ## Suggested Fix Add `'follow_location' => 0` (and/or `'max_redirects' => 0`) to `$ctxArray['http']` in `Drawing::setPath()` (`:140-148`), mirroring the CVE-2026-59931 fix at `Service.php:45`; alternatively follow redirects manually and

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