CVE-2026-119210 — 脆弱性インテリジェンス
mariadb-corporation — org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client, org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client, org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client
公表日:
- CVSS
- 5.9
- CISA KEV
- 未掲載（悪用がないことを意味しません）
情報源の原文（翻訳ではありません）
MariaDB Connector/J: LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE file check could be satisfied by text inside quoted identifiers, letting a malicious server read client files
## Summary
MariaDB Connector/J checked a server's LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE file request by
searching the text of the command it had sent for
`LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '<file>'`. The search also matched inside quoted
identifiers, string literals and comments, so text returned by the server and
re-used in a later query could satisfy it. A rogue or MitM server can read any
file the client JVM can read.
## Details
When a server answers a command with a LOCAL INFILE request (`0xFB` packet), the
connector opens the named file on the client host and streams it to the server,
after verifying that the file corresponds to a `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` of the
command it sent (`ClientMessage.validateLocalFileName()`). That verification was a
regular expression whose prefix accepted any character, so it answered "does the
text appear anywhere in the SQL", including inside a backtick-quoted identifier.
Several driver paths put identifiers returned by the server straight back into
their next query: `DatabaseMetaData.getImportedKeys()` and `getExportedKeys()`
re-use database and table names from `SHOW DATABASES`, `SHOW TABLES` and the
`REFERENCES` clause of `SHOW CREATE TABLE` output, and updatable result sets build
their `UPDATE` and refresh `SELECT` from the schema and table names of the column
definition packets. A server returning an identifier such as
``LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/passwd'`` makes the connector send
``SHOW CREATE TABLE `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/passwd'`.`accounts` ``; the
server answers it with a LOCAL INFILE request for `/etc/passwd`, the check
passes, and the file content is sent. On the `getImportedKeys()` path the
resulting error is swallowed and the application observes nothing. The same
applies to an application that interpolates identifiers obtained from the
server into its own queries.
The fix parses the command instead of searching it: string literals, quoted
identifiers and comments are skipped, statements are split on `;`, and only a
`LOAD DATA|XML [LOW_PRIORITY|CONCURRENT] LOCAL INFILE` found at the start of a
statement is considered, its file literal or bound parameter being compared
exactly to the requested file.
## Impact
Confidentiality: a malicious or compromised server, or a MitM, can read arbitrary
files from the host running the JDBC client (application configuration,
credential files, key stores, ...) through standard `java.sql` calls such as
`DatabaseMetaData.getImportedKeys()`, `getExportedKeys()` or
`ResultSet.updateRow()`. Exploitation requires control of the server side of the
connection and `allowLocalInfile` enabled (the default). Setting
`allowLocalInfile=false` is a workaround when LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE is not
needed. No integrity or availability impact.
## Credit
Reported by buxuwa (buxu) through HackerOne