CVE-2026-119284 — 脆弱性インテリジェンス
— joserfc
公表日:
- CVSS
- 0
- CISA KEV
- 未掲載（悪用がないことを意味しません）
情報源の原文（翻訳ではありません）
joserfc: Compact JWS size guard allocates attacker-controlled segments before rejection
## Summary
joserfc 1.7.4 defines compact-JWS header, payload, and signature limits, but
calls `value.split(b".")` before validating them. Python `bytes.split()` copies
the attacker-controlled segments, so the current guard allocates roughly one
complete payload before rejecting it.
## Reproduction
```bash
.venv-research/bin/python 06-practical-testing/preauth-memory-profile.py
```
The input is resident before a fork-isolated verifier runs, and every signature
is invalid.
| Input | Peak RSS delta | Amplification | Result |
|---:|---:|---:|---|
| 1 MiB | 1.11 MiB | 1.11× | size rejected |
| 4 MiB | 4.04 MiB | 1.01× | size rejected |
| 8 MiB | 8.04 MiB | 1.01× | size rejected |
| 16 MiB | 16.04 MiB | 1.00× | size rejected |
| 32 MiB | 31.74 MiB | 0.99× | size rejected |
| 64 MiB | 63.80 MiB | 1.00× | size rejected |
The unconstrained profile is the primary evidence: joserfc allocates an
additional attacker-sized object before producing its intended
`ExceededSizeError`. A separate baseline-plus-headroom stress test raises
`MemoryError` when that copy cannot fit, but this report does not characterize
an absolute `RLIMIT_AS` value as a realistic worker memory budget.
## Security Argument
The issue is not that joserfc can prevent the transport layer from receiving a
large header. The issue is narrower: once bytes reach `deserialize_compact()`,
the library's existing size guard cannot fulfill its allocation-limiting purpose
because attacker-controlled segment copies are created first.
This differs from
[GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4](https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4),
which concerned embedding already-loaded oversized segments in exception and log
messages. Here, the current implementation itself creates an additional
payload-sized allocation before its fixed size exception.
## Recommended Fix
Check `len(value)` against a maximum compact-serialization size before
`split()`. If per-segment diagnostics are needed, locate delimiters with bounded
`find()` operations or memory views, validate offsets and lengths, and only then
materialize acceptable segments.